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I. INTRODUCTION
While playing outside in the front yard of her house, a little
girl, Suzie, is seriously injured when a man riding a bicycle
negligently runs over her. The mother of the young girl, Rose,
witnesses the entire accident from the front porch and suffers
severe emotional distress and mental anguish from the experience.
This hypothetical is the precise situation the legislature was
seeking to redress in enacting Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.6,
approving the recovery of bystander damages. By allowing certain
classes of bystanders to recover for mental anguish and emotional
distress suffered after witnessing injury to another person or
coming upon the scene soon thereafter,' the legislature is
promoting the tort goals of compensating true injury and deterring
undesirable conduct. Unfortunately, in doing this, the legislature
failed to address many issues, which resulted in numerous
unanswered questions. Specifically, what is the nature of the
Copyright 2005, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. La. Civ. Code art. 2315.6.
"A. The following persons who view an event causing injury to another person,
or who come upon the scene of the event soon thereafter, may recover damages
for mental anguish or emotional distress that they suffer as a result of the other
person's injury:
(1) The spouse, child or children, and grandchild or grandchildren of the injured
person, or either the spouse, the child or children, or the grandchild or
grandchildren of the injured person.
(2) The father and mother of the inured person or either of them.
(3) The brothers and sisters of the injured person or any of them.
(4) The grandfather and grandmother of the injured person, or either of them.
B. To recover for mental anguish or emotional distress under this Article, the
injured person must suffer such harm that one can reasonably expect a person in
the claimant's position to suffer serious mental anguish or emotional distress
from the experience, and the claimant's mental anguish or emotional distress
must be severe, debilitating, and foreseeable. Damages suffered as a result of
mental anguish or emotional distress for injury to another shall be recovered
only in accordance with this Article."
2. See Frank L. Maraist & Thomas C. Galligan, Louisiana Tort Law § 15-
2, at 101 (Mitchie 1996).
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bystander claim, i.e., is the claim derivative 3 of the primary
victim's injury? Also, in the context of automobile liability
insurance policies and the Medical Malpractice Act (MMA), is the
claim subject to a separate ceiling of applicable liability limits or is
the bystander required to share the same cap as that of the primary
tort victim? Lastly, what is the bystander's role in the Workers'
Compensation Act (WCA)? These are the questions which this
comment addresses.
When the lack of legislative guidance is combined with the
inconsistent statements of the lower courts4 and the dodging of the
issue by the Louisiana Supreme Court,5 the nature of the bystander
claim is far from clear. In addition to the need to reconcile the
conflicting court opinions, the nature of the bystander claim is a
serious concern in the context of automobile insurance coverage,
medical malpractice liability and workers' compensation.
Although the extent of coverage in the various contexts largely
turns on the particular language of the policies and statutory
provisions, the extent of the policy limits available is oftentimes
dependent on whether or not the asserted claim is derivative of the
injured victim's claim. 6
3. A derivative claim is one which "does not come into existence until
someone else is injured." Crabtree v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 93-0509
(La. 1994), 632 So. 2d 736, 740. The distinction between derivative and non-
derivative is important, as it is applied in determining statutory or contractual
limits on recovery. Maraist & Galligan, supra note 2, § 7-2(d), at 156.
4. Compare Moody v. United National Insurance Co., 95-1 (La. App. 5th
Cir. 05/10/95), 657 So. 2d 236, 240 ("[C]laims for damages under article 2315.6
... are derived from the bodily injury to the tort victim .... ." (citing Sandoz v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 620 So. 2d 441, 444 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 06/09/93))), with Sandoz, 620 So. 2d at 445 (specifically declining to
"address whether we find Mr. Sandoz's claim is derivative .... ).
5. Crabtree, 632 So. 2d at 741 (finding it "unnecessary to decide in this
case whether a Lejeune claim 'derives from' or 'results from' the other tort
victim's bodily injuries.").
6. E.g., Ferrell v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 96-3028 (La. 07/01/97),
696 So. 2d 569, 577 (holding that a wife's loss of consortium claim is derivative
of her husband's claim and, therefore, can only be satisfied out of the per person
bodily injury limits of the automobile liability insurance policy); Moody, 675
So. 2d at 240 (finding the parents' bystander damage claims derived from the
malpractice injury to their son and, therefore, are included within the same cap
as their son's claim). See generally Raney v. Walter 0. Moss Regional
Hospital, 93-145 (La. App. 3d Cir. 01/05/94), 629 So. 2d 485, 488-89
(discussing the application of workers' compensation exclusivity to loss of
consortium based on the claim's derivative nature (citing Cushing v. Time Saver
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An independent duty exists to protect a plaintiff from mental
anguish damages occasioned by the injury to a third person.7 This
is largely the reason why a bystander claim is not a derivative
claim. Consequently, in addition to other reasons, a bystander
should not be constrained to the single person limits of automobile
liability insurance policies, medical malpractice liability caps, or
workers' compensation exclusivity provisions, especially when
those constraints are based on the derivative nature of the claim.
Since many answers are reached based on the derivative nature
of a claim, the initial purpose of this paper is to resolve the conflict
regarding the nature of the bystander claim. The non-derivative
nature of the bystander claim is evidenced through the comparison
of the claim with established derivative claims of loss of
consortium, wrongful death, and survival actions and by
emphasizing the independent duty owed to the bystander. The
establishment of the bystander claim as non-derivative aids in the
explanation of why a bystander claimant should be allotted the
aggregate limits of liability under automobile insurance policies,
separate caps under the MMA, and excluded altogether from the
provisions of workers' compensation exclusivity.
Part II provides a brief background surrounding the enactment
of Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.6. Part III analyzes the nature
of the bystander claim, resolving the contested issue concerning
the claim's derivative status in favor of the non-derivative nature
of the claim. Part IV addresses the treatment of bystander damages
within the framework of automobile liability insurance policies and
the MMA, stressing the need to allow the bystander access to
increased limits of coverage, and the exclusion of the claim from
the workers' compensation exclusivity provision. Finally, Part V
concludes with a reiteration that the bystander claim is not
derivative of the trauma victim's injury, the bystander's
entitlement to separate limits of liability, and the non-applicability
of workers' compensation exclusivity. By eliminating any
temptation to treat bystander claims as derivative actions, this
paper calls for Louisiana courts to recognize the independent
nature of the bystander claim, necessitating the individual
treatment of the claim in automobile liability insurance policies
and the MMA and excluding the claim altogether from the WCA.
Stores, Inc., 552 So. 2d 731, 731-32 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/14/89), writ denied,
556 So. 2d 1281 (1990))).
7. Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hospital, 556 So. 2d 559, 569 (La. 1990).
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II. BYSTANDER DAMAGE CLAIMS: 135 YEARS IN WAITING
"We cannot let the difficulties of adjudication frustrate the
principle that there be a remedy for every substantial wrong."
-Justice Tobriner8
The Louisiana Supreme Court decision of Black v. The
Carrollton Railroad Company9 in 1855 set the stage for 135 years
of jurisprudence denying recovery for mental anguish based on
injury to another. Black involved a train wreck caused by the
Carrollton Railroad Company's negligence.' 0 A fourteen-year-old
boy who was a passenger on the train suffered two broken legs. 11
The boy's father, who was not a passenger, attempted to recover
for the shock to his parental feelings and the anxiety stemming
from his son's injuries. 12
Several reasons were advanced in support of the rule
announced by the supreme court in Black. First, there was the
concern that defendants and the courts would be subject to
"spurious and fraudulent claims."' 3  Second, allowing bystander
recovery may subject the defendant to a "myriad of claims." 4
Third, allowing bystander recovery may open the floodgates of
8. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 919 (Cal. 1968). Justice Tobriner was the
California Supreme Court Justice who wrote the opinion in Dillon. This is a
noteworthy statement made by him in the opinion which allowed a mother who
witnessed her child's death at the hands of a negligent driver to recover for her
emotional distress. Id. at 919.
9. 10 La. Ann. 33 (La. 1855), overruled by Lejeune, 556 So. 2d 559. In
rejecting the existence of a claim based on the negligent infliction of injury on
another, the court stated "we are not disposed to admit the soundness of a
doctrine, which would extend vindictive damages to a case like the present" Id.
at 38.
10. Id. at 37.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 38.
13. See, e.g., Blackwell v. Oser, 436 So. 2d 1293, 1295 (La. App. 4th Cir.
07/08/83) (summarizing the reasons employed by jurisdictions for limiting or
prohibiting bystander recovery).
14. Cullen J. Dupuy, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: The Effect
ofArticle 2315.6, 53 La. L. Rev. 555, 571 (1992). This was an obvious concern
of the supreme court, which stated in Black, "the consequence of an offense to
the offender would be greater or less, in proportion to the larger or smaller circle
of friends of him who has been offended." Black, 10 La. Ann. at 38-39.
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litigation.' 5 Lastly, moral factors influenced the court in Black: 16
An important reason for denying recovery in the case was the
Court's perception that mental anguish damages were punitive in
nature, implying moral culpability on the part of the defendant
when that culpability may be lacking.'
7
While other jurisdictions in this country were adopting
exceptions for allowing recovery,18 Louisiana adhered to the Black
decision until 1990.19 In fact, it took Louisiana twenty-two years
20
to recognize and approve what the California Supreme Court
accepted in its 1968 decision of Dillon v. Legg.21
In the 1990 case of Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hospital,22 the
Louisiana Supreme Court overruled its decision in Black, reversing
135 years of jurisprudence. Lejeune involved a widow who
brought an action against the defendant hospital to recover for the
mental anguish she suffered upon discovering that her hospitalized,
15. Dupuy, supra note 14, at 571 (citing Holland v. St. Paul Mercury, 135
So. 2d 145, 155 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961)).
16. Blackwell, 436 So. 2d at 1295.
17. Id. (citing Black, 10 La. Ann. 33).
18. The two exceptions are the impact rule and the zone of danger rule. The
impact rule allowed recovery of claims for mental anguish if accompanied by
physical injury. The zone of danger rule permitted bystanders who were
sufficiently close to the danger to recover. Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hospital,
556 So. 2d 559, 564 (La. 1990). Although these rules are often described as
"exceptions," it is important to recognize that the rules may not be exceptions at
all, but completely different theories of recovery in which the tortuous conduct
is actually directed at the mental anguish victim and there is an "especial
likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress." Maraist and Galligan, supra
note 2, § 5-8, at 124 (citing Moresi v. State, 567 So. 2d 1081, 1096 (La. 1990)).
19. Although the Louisiana Supreme Court did not recognize bystander
recovery until 1990, some lower court decisions did. Mariast and Galligan,
supra note 2, § 5-8, p. 126-27.
20. This is not to say that Louisiana was slow to react, as Louisiana was not
alone in its hesitancy to recognize bystander damages. See, e.g., James v. Lieb,
375 N.W.2d 109 (Neb. 1985); Ramirez v. Armstrong, 673 P.2d 822 (N.M.
1983); Nielson v. AT&T Corp., 597 N.W.2d 434 (S.D. 1999).
21. Dillon, 441 P.2d 912. This case was cited by the Louisiana Supreme
Court in support of its decision in Lejeune. Lejeune, 556 So. 2d at 564. The
California Supreme Court set the stage by allowing recovery to a mother who
suffered emotional trauma and shock to her nervous system after witnessing the
collision which caused the death of her child. The court's justification partially
being that "when a child is endangered, it is not beyond contemplation that its
mother will be somewhere in the vicinity, and will suffer serious shock." 441
P.2d at 914 (citing Prosser, Law of Torts 353 (3d ed. 1964)).
22. 556 So. 2d 559.
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comatose husband had been bitten by rats. 23 Rewarding damages
to the widow, the court clearly upheld recovery for the mental pain
and anguish sustained by a person due to the negligent infliction of
injury on a third person. However, this endorsement of bystander
damages was not limitless. The court imposed restrictions on this
bystander recovery: (1) the claimant must view the accident or
injury-causing event or come upon the accident scene soon
thereafter; (2) the mental pain and anguish must be reasonable; (3)
the mental pain and anguish must be serious and foreseeable; and
(4) the claimant must have a close relationship with the person
injured.25
The supreme court did not provide an answer to all bystander
recovery questions, "leav[ing] for another day a decision whether
recovery should be allowed only for close relatives (and if so,
which ones), or rather, for those with simply a close relationship to
the victim."26 However, the legislature stepped in and provided an
answer to this question by adopting Louisiana Civil Code article
2315.6 on July 19, 1991, codifying the supreme court's holding in
Lejeune.27 Article 2315.6 is nearly identical to the restrictions
listed in Lejeune, the sole exception being the legislature's
clarification of the close relationships necessary to recover-the
spouse, children, grandchildren, parents, siblings, and grandparents
of the trauma victim.
28
After the supreme court decision in Lejeune and the
legislature's adoption of Civil Code article 2315.6, the policy
reasons underlying the Black ruling are highly questionable. First,
the worry of spurious and fraudulent claims is unwarranted
23. Id. at 561.
24. See id. at 559.
25. Id. at 570.
26. Id. at 570-71. The court found it unnecessary to define the class of
claimants, as the bystander in the case was the wife of the trauma victim and,
therefore, however narrowly the court chooses to limit the class, "the wife of the
directly injured victim qualifies." Id. at 571.
27. E.g., Trahan v. McManus, 97-1224 (La. 03/02/99), 728 So. 2d 1273,
1278. Since La. Civ. Code art. 2315.6 is a codification of Lejeune, which
involved a negligent act, it is possible that although the article states that
"damages suffered as a result of mental anguish or emotional distress for injury
to another shall be recovered only in accordance with this article," La. Civ. Code
art. 2315.6, the article may not be applicable to bystander claims based on,
particularly, the intentional infliction of injury on a third person. See Dupuy,
supra note 14, at 570 and Louisiana State Senate Committee on Judiciary,
Section A, Minutes of Meeting of May 21, 1991.
28. Compare Lejeune, 556 So. 2d at 570, with La. Civ. Code art. 2315.6.
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because it is dealt with by "careful scrutiny of the evidence
supporting the claim,',29 as is done in any other case. As stated by
one legal writer Cullen Dupuy, "The elimination of trivialities calls
for nothing more than the same common sense which has
distinwuished serious from trifling injuries in other fields of the
law." In addition, the legislature helped to forestall this concern
by requiring that the mental anguish be reasonable, serious, and
foreseeable, and that the direct victim suffer such harm as to make
it reasonable for the claimant to suffer such serious emotional
distress. 31 Second, the bystander recovery rule in 2315.6 takes
care of the "myriad of claims" problem by limiting the bystanders
who may recover to close family members who view the accident
or come upon the scene soon thereafter.32 Third, the possibility of
opening the floodgates of litigation is not an acceptable excuse for
denying bystanders access to the courts. Dupuy recognized the
fallacy of this reason noting, "The job of the courts is to resolve
disputes between parties. When the parties have genuine claims
that should be redressed, they should not be denied access merely
because there may be many others with similar claims." 33 This is
an unacceptable "argument of expediency rather than of justice., 34
Lastly, the concern of the court in Black based on the punitive
nature of the bystander claim is of no consequence any longer
because mental anfuish is now recognized as compensatory or
actual in this state.
III. THE INDEPENDENT DUTY OWED TO THE BYSTANDER
"If he is negligent, where danger is to be foreseen, a liability
will follow-and foresight of the consequences involves the
creation of a duty."'
-Judge Benjamin Cardozo 36
29. Dupuy, supra note 14, at 572.
30. Id.
31. La. Civ. Code art. 2315.6. See also id.
32. Id. See also Dupuy, supra note 14, at 571.
33. Dupuy, supra note 14, at 571.
34. Id.
35. Blackwell v. Oser, 436 So. 2d 1293, 1297 (La. App. 4th Cir. 07/08/83)
(citing Jiles v. Venus Community Center Benev. Mut. Aid Ass'n, 191 La. 803,
186 So. 2d 342, 345 (La. 1939)).
36. Judge Augustine cited this statement of the New York Judge in
MacPherson v. Buick, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (Ct. App. N.Y. 1916) in the
Louisiana case Blackwell, 436 So. 2d at 1298.
2005]
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A. The Bystander as a Derivative Victim: An Erroneous
Assumption
A derivative claim is one which "does not come into existence
until someone else is injured., 37 Based on this definition, as well
as other factors, an individual is not completely unjustified in
initially presuming that a bystander claim is derivative in nature.
Without knowledge of and inquiry into the history surrounding the
bystander claim, it is an easy assumption to make. 38 The statutory
language chosen by the legislature in article 2315.6 only
contributes to this presumption. For instance, article 2315.6 is
entitled "liability for damages caused by injury to another."39 In
addition, the article states that the bystander may recover damages
for the mental anguish and emotional distress suffered "as a result
of the other person's injury.' 4°  In terms of strict statutory
construction, all of this language seems to indicate that bystander
damages are derivative. However, as will soon be shown, this
interpretation falls in the face of the history surrounding the
development of the bystander claim.
Article 2315.6 dictates that "the injured person suffer such
harm that one can reasonably expect a person in the claimant's
position to suffer serious mental anguish or emotional distress
from the experience."' 1 The requirement that the injured person
suffer a particular magnitude of harm could also easily lead one to
infer that the claim is derivative of the trauma victim's claim.
However, another viable explanation for this requisite is the
assurance of the meritoriousness of a bystander's claim.
Individuals are not alone in their assumption, as some of the
courts have also succumbed to the assumption that bystander
37. Crabtree v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 93-0509 (La. 02/28/94),
632 So. 2d 736, 740 (citing Shepard v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co., 545 So. 2d 624, 629 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989)).
38. See William E. Crawford, Torts: Recent Developments, 59 La. L. Rev.
415 (1999). Crawford cites an alternate definition for a derivative claim than
that utilized by Louisiana Courts: A claim that is "viable only if it arises from
the injury to a primary victim whose claim itself is viable; i.e., a defendant not
liable to the primary victim for his injury would not be liable to the derivative
claimant." From this definition, he merely draws the conclusion that bystander
damages are derivative. The bystander is a "primary victim," which evidences
the fallacy in this definition and the error in concluding that the bystander claim
is derivative.
39. La. Civ. Code art. 2315.6 (emphasis added).
40. Id. (emphasis added).
41. Id. (emphasis added).
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damages are derivative in nature. 42  In the fifth circuit case of
Crabtree v. State Farm Insurance Co., 4 3 the court erroneously
analogized bystander damages to loss of consortium and wrongful
death claims, which jurisprudence uniformly holds are derivative
of a single bodily injury. As a result, the court stated, "Article
2315.6 claims are derived from the bodily injury to the tort
victim."" Although the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the
fifth circuit on different grounds, expressing "no opinion regarding
the correctness of the lower courts' findings, ' 45 they implied that if
the issue had been before them they would have come to the
opposite conclusion: "In Lejeune, this court found the defendant
hospital owed an independent duty to protect the plaintiff .... 46
The existence of this independent duty is explored further in
Subpart C.
B. The Distinguishing Features of Bystander Damage Claims
The derivative analysis should not apply to claims for
bystander mental anguish under Louisiana Civil Code article
2315.6. Although a derivative claim is one which "does not come
into existence until someone else is injured, ' '47 as will be
demonstrated, all claims that come into existence only when
someone else is injured are not and should not be deemed
derivative. As a matter of law, claims for loss of consortium are
derivative of the primary victim's injuries. 48  Wrongful death
claims are also probably derivative in nature. 49 In addition, not
only is the survival action derivative in nature, but it is actually the
victim's claim surviving his death.50 However, bystander damage
claims are distinguishable from these derivative claims.
42. Moody v. United National Insurance Co., 95-1 (La. App. 5th Cir.
05/10/95), 657 So. 2d 236, 240.
43. 613 So. 2d 701 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 93-
0509 (La. 02/28/94), 632 So. 2d 736.
44. Id. at 702.
45. Crabtree, 632 So. 2d at 741-42 n.ll.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 740.
48. Ferrell v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 96-3028 (La. 07/01/97), 696
So. 2d 569, 577.
49. William E. Crawford, Tort Law § 21.11, in 12 Louisiana Civil Law
Treatise 412, 413 (2000).
50. See La. Civ. Code art. 2315.1; Maraist & Galligan, supra note 2, § 18-6,
at 423-24.
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A loss of consortium claim is based on damage to the
relationship with a living person, the tort victim. Similarly, a
claim for wrongful death is for damage to a relationship caused by
the death of the tort victim. 52 Unlike both of these claims, a claim
for bystander damages is not a claim asserting harm to a relational
interest. The bystander is not seeking damages to soothe the grief
and bereavement resulting from the injury or death of the tort
victim. 53 Bystander damages are independent of these relational
losses, as the bystander is seeking recompense for an independent
injury inflicted on the bystander by the defendant. 54
A loss of consortium claim "hinges" not only on the injury to
the victim, but is "directly intertwined" with the behavior and
abilities of the victim after the event.55 Loss of consortium results
from the deterioration of the tort victim, which in turn, causes the
family losses, 56 i.e., loss of society, services, support, and
impairment of sexual relations. 57 Thus, until an injured party's
condition deteriorates to such an extent that his family is actually
deprived of his consortium, they have suffered no injury. In fact, if
the injurious effects on the victim end up being minimal, the
impact on the society, services, support, and sexual relations is
lessened, entitling the consortium claimant to fewer damages.
These losses are not immediate and may not arise at all if the status
quo of the relationship is not affected by the injury.
On the other hand, the bystander claim exists immediately at
the moment of the injury-causing event. Of crucial relevance and
importance in bystander damages is the event causing injury to the
tort victim and the likelihood that the event is so traumatizing as to
result in mental anguish and emotional distress.58 Although "the
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672, 675 n.3 (Pa. 1979).
54. See Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hospital, 556 So. 2d 559, 567 (citing
Louisiana appellate cases recognizing an "independent duty owed to an
aggrieved non-traumatically injured plaintiff.").
55. Raney v. Walter 0. Moss Regional Hospital, 93-145 (La. App. 3d Cir.
01/05/94), 629 So. 2d 485, 489.
56. See id.
57. Maraist & Galligan, supra note 2, § 7-2(d), at 154.
58. See, e.g., Lejeune, 556 So. 2d at 570 n.11 (acknowledging the
recognition in other states that "the essence of the tort is the shock caused by the
perception of the especially horrendous event"); Trahan v. McManus, 97-1224
(La. 03/02/99), 728 So. 2d 1273, 1277 ("[S]hock resulted from a direct
emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous
[Vol. 66
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injured person must suffer such harm that one can reasonably
expect a person in the claimant's position to suffer serious mental
anguish or emotional distress from the experience," 59 the amount
of bystander recovery has no correlation to the future disposition of
the tort victim. The fact that the victim's long-term injurious
effects end up being minimal does not minimize the bystander's
claim. The differences between bystander damages and loss of
consortium claims are exemplified in the fifth circuit case of
Spears v. Jefferson Parish School Board6° stating, "Prior to trial
the parents stipulated that they did not have an individual cause of
action which met the requirements of 2315.6, but reserved their
right to seek damages for loss of consortium.61
Of consequence to the analysis of the nature of bystander
recovery and a reason adverse to any analogy between bystander
recovery and wrongful death, consortium, and survival claims is
the range of individuals permitted to seek recovery for the
claims. Although the list of beneficiaries permitted under all
means of recovery are the same, i.e. the spouse, children,
grandchildren, parent(s), and siblings,63 in the context of wrongful
death, 64 loss of consortium, 65 and survival actions66 the legislature
specifically preempts recovery by those in a lower category when
there is a beneficiary in a higher category. On the other hand, in
bystander recovery claims any and all of the beneficiaries may
recover damages as long as the codal requirements are satisfied."
The impact of this distinction is explained further in Subpart C.
observance of the accident." (citing Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920 (Cal.
1968))).
59. La. Civ. Code art. 2315.6.
60. 94-352 (La. App. 5th Cir. 11/16/94), 646 So. 2d 1104.
61. Id. at 1107 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
62. Compare La. Civ. Code art. 2315.5 (1987), with 2315.6 (1985).
63. La. Civ. Code arts. 2315.6, 2315.5.
64. La. Civ. Code art. 2315.5. The articles states: "[T]he other child or
children of the deceased, or if the deceased left no other child surviving, the
other survivors enumerated in the applicable provisions . . . , in order of
preference stated, may bring a survival action .. " (emphasis added).
65. La. Civ. Code art. 2315. That article states: "Loss of consortium ...
shall be recoverable by the same respective categories of persons who would
have had a cause of action for wrongful death...
66. La. Civ. Code art. 2315.1.
67. La. Civ. Code art. 2315.6. The article states: "The following persons
... may recover damages .... " Id. There is no hierarchical limitation in the
statutory language.
2005]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
C. The Bystander Claim: A Tort in a Class all its Own
Individuals have an interest in freedom from mental
68disturbances. This is an independent interest that is compensable
when it is interfered with by another.69  The corollary to this
independent interest is the existence of an independent duty to
protect an individual from mental anguish damages occasioned by
the infliction of injury to a third person. 70 Many of the cases stress
the existence of this independent duty as a prerequisite to
bystander recovery.7 1 If the bystander claim was merely derivative
of the primary victim's injuries, then the focus on the independent
duty owed to the bystander would be unnecessary, as the duty
owed to the trauma victim is of prime importance in a derivative
claim.
In the words of the Louisiana third circuit, there is "no
distinction between emotional distress and physical injury with
respect to the right of recovery., 7 2  In fact, Louisiana recognizes
the torts of intentional infliction of emotional distress and
negligent infliction of emotional distress.74 These are independent
torts, not parasitic to a physical injury or traditional tort.75 There is
68. See Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hospital, 556 So. 2d 559, 563 (La. 1990).
69. See id.
70. Id. at 569.
71. See, e.g., Wartelle v. Women's & Children's Hospital, Inc., 97-0744
(La. 12/02/97), 704 So. 2d 778, 785 ("[Bystander action] results from the breach
of an independent duty owed by the tortfeasor to a bystander who is closely
related to the victim." (citing Crabtree v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 93-
0509 (La. 02/28/94), 632 So. 2d 736, 741 n. 11; Lejeune, 556 So. 2d 559)).
72. See Guillory v. Arceneaux, 580 So. 2d 990, 996 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1991), writ denied, 578 So. 2d 694 (1991) (reciting the position adopted by the
concurring justices in the supreme court case of Clomon v. Monroe City School
Bd, 572 So. 2d 571 (La. 1990)).
73. White v. Monsanto Co., 585 So. 2d 1205, 1209 (La. 1991) (affirming
the viability in Louisiana of a cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress). Recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress lies
against "[o]ne who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally causes
severe emotional distress to another. . . ." Id. The court cited Lejeune, 556 So.
2d at 570, for the assertion that "[1]iability arises only where the mental
suffering or anguish is extreme." Id. at 1210.
74. Maraist & Galligan, supra note 2, § 5-8, at 124.
75. See White v. Monsanto Co., 585 So. 2d 1205, 1208 (La. 1991) (citing
Annotation, Modern Status of Intentional Infliction of Mental Distress as
Independent Tort, "Outrage", 38 A.L.R. 4th 998 (1985)). Louisiana requires
neither impact nor ripening. An award is proper when the conduct is directed at
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no reason why a separate tort does not also exist for the benefit of
the bystander. As stated by the Louisiana Supreme Court in
Lejeune, "The essence of the tort is the shock caused by the
perception of the especially horrendous event." 76 In recognition of
this separate tort and "independent duty owed to an aggrieved,
non-traumatically injured [claimant], ' 7 7 the bystander claim is not
derivative in nature even though the distress results from
witnessing injuries to another.
Although the victim of the traumatic event must suffer such
harm to render reasonable the mental anguish and emotional
distress of the bystander,78 the focus of the bystander claim is on
the traumatic circumstances surrounding the injury.79 The trauma
victim may be severely injured, but the bystander can be
foreclosed from recovery if the events surrounding the injury are
not sufficiently traumatic. 80  If the bystander claim was truly
derivative in nature, the severity of the tort victim's injury would
be determinative and not the circumstances of the accident.
81
However, in the context of bystander damage claims, bodily injury
to the trauma victim is not adequate. This is understandable since
a bystander claim is not just an alternate theory of recovery for the
injury to the direct tort victim. A traumatic injury-inducing event
is necessary in order to hinder spurious and fraudulent claims.
Based on the interpretation of Louisiana courts, the legislature
"intended to allow recovery of bystander damages to compensate
for the immediate shock of witnessing a traumatic event which
cause[s] the direct victim immediate harm that is severe and
apparent . ,82 Hence, bystander damages are not intended to be
compensation for the "anguish and distress that normally
the mental anguish victim and the circumstances show an especial likelihood of
genuine and serious mental distress. Maraist & Galligan, supra note 2, § 5-8, at
124.
76. Lejeune, 556 So. 2d at 570 n. I1 (citing Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d
193 (Wyo. 1986)).
77. See id. at 567.
78. La. Civ. Code art. 2315.6.
79. See Lejeune, 556 So. 2d at 570 n. 11.
80. See Trahan v. McManus, 97-1224 (La. 03/02/99), 728 So. 2d 1273.
81. See Raney v. Walter 0. Moss Regional Hospital, 93-0145 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 12/08/93), 629 So. 2d 485, 489, writ denied, 94-0347 (La. 04/07/94), 635
So. 2d 1134.
82. Held v. Aubert, 02-1486 (La. App. 1st Cir. 05/09/03), 845 So. 2d 625,
632 (citing Trahan, 728 So. 2d at 1279).
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accompany an injury to a loved one under all circumstances." 83 If
this was the intention of the legislature, then an assertion of the
derivative nature of the bystander claim is advanced. However,
this requirement of real and serious shock experienced by a
bystander substantiates the bystander claim as an independent tort
and, therefore, is not derivative in nature.
Also, since there can be recovery of bystander damages for
anyone in the denominated list of beneficiaries regardless of
hierarchy, in addition to serving as a distinguishing factor from
other derivative claims, this independently supports the contention
that the claim is not derivative in nature. If the claim was simply
derivative in nature, allowing multiple classes of beneficiaries to
recover for bystander damages would move the claim further
toward the status of punitive damages, essentially permitting
duplicate recovery. This was a major concern for the supreme
court in Black because Louisiana disfavors punitive damages.84
Louisiana permits -unitive damage awards only pursuant to
specific legislation. If the legislature had intended bystander
damages to be punitive in nature, they would have specifically
enumerated the claim as an instance in which punitive damages
can be recovered. Since they did not, the only viable alternative is
to recognize bystander damages as non-derivative.
The independent nature of the bystander is furthered by the
Lejeune court's application of a duty-risk analy sis 86 in determining
whether bystander damages were warranted. 8  The application of
this analysis to bystander claims is significant because the analysis
is the basis for establishing a duty owed to the bystander.88 "The
court focused on the foreseeablity of the mental distress injury to
the [bystander] ... in determining whether a duty on the part of the
[tortfeasor] existed., 89 In addition, pre-Lejeune cases discussed the
bystander's burden of proving the existence of a duty
encompassing the risk of harm encountered, the unreasonableness
83. Id.
84. Black v. The Carrolton R.R. Co., 10 La. Ann. 33, at 38 (1885).
85. Maraist & Galligan, supra note 2, § 7-1, at 148.
86. The duty-risk analysis simply asks "(1) did the defendant violate a duty
owed to this plaintiff and (2) did that duty protect this plaintiff from this risk,
which arose in this manner." Maraist & Galligan, supra note 2, § 5-4, at 104.
87. Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hospital, 556 So. 2d 559, 564 (La. 1990).
88. See Maraist & Galligan, supra note 2, § 5-4, at 105.
89. Lejeune, 556 So. 2d at 564 (discussing Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912,
920 (Cal. 1968)).
[Vol. 66
of the risk, and the breach of the duty resulting in damages.90 The
legislature codified these principles in Civil Code article 2315.6,
requiring, among other things, that the claimant's mental anguish
or emotional distress be foreseeable.91
The application of these negligence principles makes the
bystander claim analogous to the non-derivative tort of negligent
infliction of emotional distress. The presence of these negligence
principles in the context of bystander damages further
demonstrates the independent nature of the bystander claim,
negating the derivative assertion. The duty-risk analysis is
unwarranted in the context of a derivative claim, as the emphasis in
a derivative claim is on the duty owed to the injured victim (and
not the bystander) and the foreseeability of the damages resulting
therefrom. 92 Since the reasonable foreseeability of mental anguish
and emotional distress is a primary consideration in the awarding
of bystander damages,93 the weights in favor of establishing
bystander damages as a derivative claim are lifted. As stated by
the first circuit in the 1961 case of Holland v. St. Paul Mercury
Insurance Co.,9 4 "the defendant's duty ... [is] neither secondary,
derivative nor dependent upon injury to a third party, but, on the
contrary, is direct, primary and independent of an alleged tort in
relation" to the trauma victim.
95
III. A BYSTANDER'S PLACE IN THE INSURANCE SCHEME
A. A Passenger Standing By
Suppose instead of involving a negligent bicycler, the
hypothetical introducing this comment involves the negligent
driver of a vehicle who ran over Suzie with his automobile. Rose,
the mother, institutes a claim for bystander damages for the mental
anguish arising from her observance of the accident. The issue in
90. See Bishop v. Callais, 533 So. 2d 121, 123 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989),
writ denied, 536 So. 2d 1214 (1989).
91. La. Civ. Code art. 2315.6.
92. See Ferrell v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 92-3028 (La. 07/01/97),
696 So. 2d 569, 574 ("[B]ecause loss of consortium is not an injury to the
person who bore the direct impact of the defendant's negligence but to another
person whose relationship to the primary victim is diminished as a consequence,
it may be regarded as a secondary layer of tort liability to the primary victim."
(citing Berger v. Weber, 303 N.W.2d 424, 435 (Mich. 1981) (emphasis added))).
93. E.g., La. Civ. Code art. 2315.6.
94. 135 So. 2d 145 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
95. Id at 158.
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this hypothetical concerns the applicable limits of insurance
coverage, i.e., whether Rose is constrained to the single person
limits of the driver's automobile liability insurance policy, or if her
claim is subject to the aggregate per accident limit.
Automobile liability insurance policies provide coverage of a
particular dollar limit per person who suffers "bodily injury" in an
accident.9 6 However, these "per person" limits are not infinite.
When two or more persons suffer "bodily injury" in the same
accident, the aggregate amount of coverage for each accident
applies, without regard to the per person limits.97 For example, a
policy may provide limits of $25,000 per person with an aggregate
of $50,000 per accident. If only one person is "injured," then the
$25,000 limit applies. If more than one person is "injured" in the
same accident, the $50,000 aggregate limit is applicable.
The answer to the question posed in the hypothetical is largely
dependent on the interpretation of the automobile liability
insurance policy, i.e., what coverage is provided under the
particular contract of insurance. Louisiana jurisprudence
applicable to loss of consortium and wrongful death claims
uniformly holds that the per person limits of the insurance policy
apply.99 The underlying reasoning in this jurisprudence is that
while more than one person may suffer damages, when those
damages are derived from a "bodily injury" to only one person, the
single person limit is applicable. 00 Although some decisions
finding loss of consortium and wrongful death claims subject to the
single person limits are based on the derivative nature of the claim,
other decisions reach the same conclusion after determining that
the claims are not "bodily injuries," as that term is used in
insurance policies.1
0 1
Whether the basis of the decision is the derivative nature of the
claim or the claim's fit within the "bodily injury" term utilized in
the insurance policy, the bystander claim should be subject to the
96. See, e.g., Crabtree v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 93-0509 (La.
02/28/94), 632 So. 2d 736, 742.
97. Id.
98. Id. (involving the interpretation of the term "bodily injury" as used in
the automobile liability insurance policy).
99. E.g., Ferrell v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 96-3028 (La. 07/01/97),
696 So. 2d 569, at 577.
100. Crabtree, 632 So. 2d at 742.
101. Albin v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 498 So. 2d 171,
174 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986), writ denied, 498 So. 2d 1088 (1986) (holding that
"loss of consortium and society ... is not a bodily injury within the meaning of
[the] automobile liability insurance policy.").
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per accident aggregate limit. Ordinarily in automobile insurance
polices, "bodily injury" means "bodily injury to a person and
sickness, disease or death which results from it. Earlier
Louisiana cases rejected the assertion that purely emotional
damages constitute bodily injury, adhering to the traditional
understanding of the term as "hurt or harm to the human body or
some member thereof by contact with some external force or
violence . . ,,103 As a result, mental distress unaccompanied by
physical injury was not generally regarded as bodily injury.104 In
accordance with this definition, the courts held that bystander
mental anguish claims were not "bodily injuries;" hence, the per
person limits applied to the claims. 105
In Crabtree v. State Farm Insurance Co.,' °6 the Louisiana
Supreme Court held that the bystander claim as applied to the
automobile insurance policy in the case was a separate bodily
injury, making applicable the per accident aggregate policy
limit.'17  In arriving at this conclusion, the court stated, "an
insurance policy should not be interpreted in an unreasonable or
strained manner so as to enlarge or restrict its provisions beyond
what is reasonably contemplated by its terms or so as to achieve an
absurd conclusion."'10 8  The policy at issue in the case defined
"bodily injury to one person" as including "all iniu*ry and damages
to others resulting from this bodily injury."0 9  State Farm
contended that "bodily injury to one person" includes all injugy
including bodily injury resulting from this bodily injury.
Rejecting this contention, the court determined that "'bodily injury
102. E.g., Crabtree, 632 So. 2d at 739 (citing the language of the policy
before the court) (emphasis added).
103. Albin, 498 So. 2d at 173 (citing Nickens v. McGehee, 184 So. 2d 271
(La. App. 1 st Cir. 1966)) (emphasis added).
104. Id.
105. Sandoz v. State Farm Insurance Co., 620 So. 2d 441, 444 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1993) (finding that the per person limit applies to the father's mental
anguish claim).
106. 632 So. 2d 736.
107. Id. at 745.
108. Id. at 741 (emphasis added). See also La. Civ. Code art. 2056 (1985)
("In case of doubt that cannot be otherwise resolved, a provision in a contract
must be interpreted against the party who furnished its text. A contract executed
in a standard form of one party must be interpreted, in case of doubt, in favor of
the other party.").
109. Id. at 742.
110. Crabtree, 632 So. 2d at 742 (emphasis added).
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to one person' does not reasonably encompass bodily injury to
others under the single person limit.""'1 1
In addition to the interpretation and application of the
insurance contract at issue, the court found that bystander damages
constitute bodily injury based on prior jurisprudence of the
court. 1 1 Specifically, in order to succeed in a bystander claim, the
mental anguish must be severe and debilitating, 1 which serves to
raise bystander damages to the level of "bodily injury." In
addition, an individual's mental health is an essential component to
the overall operation of the physical structure of the body. 14
Therefore, the preclusion of bystander damages from bodily injury
merely based on the lack of actual physical injury is arbitrary.
Claims for loss of consortium, unlike bystander claims, are not
considered bodily injuries within the meaning of automobile
liability insurance policies, subjecting the claim to the single
person limits." m5 Because the bystander claim is considered a
bodily injury, its treatment should be different than loss of
consortium claims, permitting the application of the per accident
aggregate limits. In addition, if the bystander is constrained to the
single person limits and these limits are exhausted by the claims of
the injured party, then the bystander claim is essentially
extinguished as the bystander has no funds from which to recover.
This is an unacceptable result and in direct opposition to the tort
goal of compensating true injury. 116
The Crabtree court found it unnecessary to decide whether a
bystander claim derives from the other tort victim's bodily
111. Id. The court interpreted the policy to mean that "where one person
suffers bodily injury, or where one person suffers bodily injury and one or more
other persons suffer injury and damages other than bodily injury as a result of
the former's bodily injury, the amount of coverage for bodily injury to one
person applies." Id.
112. Id. at 744 (citing Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hospital, 556 So. 2d 559,
570 (La. 1990)).
113. Id.
114. See Sparks v. Tulane Medical Center Hospital & Clinic, 546 So. 2d 138,
146 (La. 1989). Although the case involved the application and interpretation of
the Workers' Compensation Act, I feel that the conclusions reached also have
application in the context of automobile liability insurance policies and the
interpretation of the term bodily injury.
115. E.g., Albin v. State Farm Insurance Co., 498 So. 2d 171, 173 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1986), writ denied, 498 So. 2d 1088.
116. Maraist & Galligan, supra note 2, § 5-2, at 101.
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injuries."17 However, it is necessary to make the determination as
courts have reached conclusions regarding automobile' policy
limits citing the derivative nature of the claim. For instance,
claims for loss of consortium are restricted to the single person
limits for reasons including the derivative nature of the claim."
18
As discussed in Part III, bystander damage claims are not
derivative of the primary victim's injury. The different treatment
allotted to the bystander claim is evidenced in a statement by the
third circuit in Conner v. Stanford:119 "The Conner children do not
have separate causes of action for mental anguish and emotional
distress under 2315.6 and, therefore, are not entitled to recover a
separate per person limit under the policy."' 0 As a result, when
the claimant does have a separate cause of action for mental
anguish and emotional distress, the bystander should be allowed to
access the extended per accident liability coverage and not be
restricted to the per person policy limits.
In conclusion, there is no basis on which a bystander can be
restricted to the per person limits of an automobile liability
insurance policy. Bystander damages are a form of bodily injury,
resulting in the availability of the aggregate per accident coverage.
Also, the non-derivative nature of the bystander claim precludes
finding that the bystander is entitled only to the excess of the per
person limits, as the injury does not simply result from the bodily
injury of the accident victim.
117. Crabtree v. State Farm Insurance Co., 93-0509 (La. 02/28/94), 632 So.
2d 736, 741 (finding the answer to the question regarding whether bystander
damages constitutes bodily injury determinative of the policy limits available).
118. Ferrell v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 96-3028 (La. 07/01/97), 696
So. 2d 569, 577 (holding that a wife's loss of consortium claim is derivative of
her husband's claim and, therefore, can only be satisfied out of the per person
bodily injury limits of the automobile liability insurance policy); Shariff v. Ohio
Casualty Insurance Co., 584 So. 2d 1223, 1226 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991), writ
denied, 589 So. 2d 1055 (La. 1991) (finding that "because the right of action and
the claim for loss of consortium are derived from the injured person's injuries,
recovery is restricted to the per person limits."); and Shepard v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 545 So. 2d 624, 630 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989)
(determining that "any loss of consortium claim is only derivative .... Such a
claim is therefore restricted to the monetary limits placed in the insurance
policy, to a per person total.").
119. Conner v. Stanford, 96-1211 (La. App. 3d Cir. 03/05/97), 692 So. 2d
1146.
120. Id. at 1148. The children did not have a bystander claim because they
were "not involved in the accident, did not witness the accident, and did not
come upon the scene shortly thereafter." Id.
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B. The Bystander: Another Person Entitled to Reasonable Care
I As the plot in the hypothetical thickens, not only is Suzie
injured after being hit by the bicycler, but upon arriving at the
hospital, the doctor negligently cuts an artery. Rose saw the entire
scene- as she watched the staff furiously trying to save her
daughter, blood squirting out of the severed artery. Fortunately,
they were able to save Suzie's life. Now, Rose seeks recovery
from the doctor who committed the act of malpractice, not only for
Suzie's injuries, but for her own mental anguish and emotional
distress.
Malpractice is any "unintentional tort or breach of contract
based on health care or professional services rendered, or which
should have been rendered, by a health care provider, to a patient
. . ,121 The Louisiana Legislature provides a mechanism
whereby a health care provider can qualify for limited liability.
Under the MMA, the health care provider's liability for
malpractice on one patient is limited to $100,000.122 A patient's
maximum recovery against all qualified health care providers for
one tort causing one injury is $500,000.123
The MMA applies exclusively to claims arising from injury to
124
or death of a patient. However, since the MMA applies to
claims not only for the actual injury to the patient, but all claims
arising from injury to or death of the patient, the claimant need not
be a patient. 17s  Nothing in the MMA distinguishes between
damage claims by a patient, by a statutory survivor of the patient,
or by a statutorily-limited relative of the patient. 126  For these
reasons, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Trahan v. McManus
127
held that although article 2315.6 provides a cause of action to
bystanders for mental anguish damages resulting from injury to or
death of the patient caused by the doctor, this cause of action is
121. La. R.S. 40:1299.41(A)(8) (2001 & Supp. 2005) (emphasis added).
122. La. R.S. 40:1299.42(B)(2) (2001) ("A health care provider qualified
under this part is not liable for an amount in excess of $100,000 for all
malpractice claims because of injuries to or death of any one patient.").
123. La. R.S. 40:1299.42(B)(1) (2001). ("The total amount recoverable for
all malpractice claims for injuries to or death of a patient ... shall not exceed
$500,000....")
124. Trahan v. McManus, 97-1224 (La. 03/02/99), 728 So. 2d 1273, 1277
(citing Hutchinson v. Patel, 93-2156 (La. 05/23/94), 637 So. 2d 415, 428)
(emphasis added).





subject to the procedures and limitations of the MMA.128 In other
words, the MMA applies to the bystander recovery action. As a
result, Rose's opportunity for recovery of bystander damages is
largely dependent on the interpretation and application of the
MMA.
A physician's negligence is not multiplied by the number of
plaintiffs. 129  Hence, the $500,000 statutory cap applies to the
patient's claim and any claims for loss of consortium, wrongful
death, or survival damages arising out of the patient's injuries. 130
As repeatedly stated, the bystander claim is distinguishable from
these derivative claims. The bystander's claim is a separate and
independent injury resulting from the negligence of the physician.
However, in the context of the MMA, the non-derivative nature of
the claim is not sufficient to allow the bystander to reap the
benefits of a separate statutory cap. The statutory language poses
an additional obstacle, especially in light of the supreme court's
holding in Trahan regarding the applicability of the MMA to
bystander damage claims. 3 '
In the case of a bystander damage claim, the negligence of the
physician is not being multiplied by the number of plaintiffs; the
physician's negligence caused damage to two different people.
First, the physician caused damage to the actual patient, i.e., the
malpractice. The physician also caused damage to the bystander
who experienced severe emotional distress after witnessing the act
of malpractice. In doing this, the physician breached the
independent duty owed to the bystander by interfering with the
bystander's interest in freedom from mental disturbance.'
32
Nonetheless, the MMA clearly states, "the total amount
recoverable for all malpractice claims for injuries to or death of a
patient . . . shall not exceed $500,000 plus interest and cost."'' 33
The $500,000 cap applies collectively to all claims which flow
from one act of malpractice resulting in a victim's injury. 134
128. Id.
129. Moody v. United National Insurance Co., 95-1 (La. App. 5th Cir.
05/10/95), 657 So. 2d 236, 240 (citing Todd v. Sauls, 94-10 (La. App. 3d Cir.
12/21/94), 647 So. 2d 1366, 1381).
130. See Turner v. Southwest Louisiana Hospital Assoc., 03-0237 (La. App.
3d Cir. 2003), 856 So. 2d 1237, 1242 (stating that the "single $500,000 cap
applies collectively to all claims which flow from one act of malpractice
resulting in a victim's injury or wrongful death.").
131. Trahan, 728 So. 2d at 1277.
132. See Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hospital, 556 So. 2d 559, 563 (La. 1990).
133. La. R.S. 40:1299.42(B)(1) (2001).
134. Turner, 856 So. 2d at 1242.
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Although the bystander's claim results from a separate injury than
that of the patient, the claim is not based on malpractice, as the
bystander is not a patient. 3 5 This conclusion can only be
reconciled with the decision in Trahan by holding the bystander
subject to the same statutory cap as the patient.
This determination does not destroy the non-derivative nature
of the bystander claim. Contrary to the fifth circuit case of Moody
v. United National Insurance Co.,136 the cap is based not on the
derivative nature of the claim, but on the application of the statute.
The fifth circuit erroneously drew the conclusion that article
2315.6 derived from the bodily injury to the tort victim, i.e., the
malpractice injury to the patient and, thus, did not constitute an
independent injury. 3 7  Not only did the court misconstrue the
holdings of a string of cases, 3 8 but, the court failed to recognize
that the bystander claim can arise from a single claim of
malpractice and still not be regarded as derivative. The cap is
based on the act of malpractice and not the patient's injuries.
Another alternative is to hold that the decision in Trahan is
wrong and the bystander claim is not governed by the MMA at all
because the bystander is not a "patient." As recognized by the
Louisiana Supreme Court, the "$500,000 limitation is special
legislation in derogation of the rights of the tort victim and,
therefore, should be strictly construed against the limitation of
damages otherwise recoverable."' 3 9 Casting further doubt on the
earlier decision of the supreme court in Trahan is the court's very
recent opinion in Williamson v. Hospital Service District No. 1 of
Jefferson.140  In finding that the medical center's alleged
negligence in failing to repair a wheelchair did not arise from
"medical malpractice" and, therefore, excluding the patient from
135. La. R.S. 40:1299.41(A)(3) (2001 & Supp. 2005). The statute defines
patient as any "natural person ... who receives or should have received health
care from a licensed health care provider, under contract.. .."
136. Moody v. United National Insurance Co., 95-1 (La. App. 5th Cir.
05/10/95), 657 So. 2d 236, 240 (holding that the parents' bystander claims are
derivative of the malpractice injury and, therefore, included within the same cap
as their son's malpractice claim).
137. Id.
138. Id. The court stated that the holding of Sandoz v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co., 620 So. 2d 441, 445 (La. App. 3d Cir. 06/09/93) was
that bystander claims were derivative in nature when, in fact, the court
specifically declined to address whether the claim is derivative.
139. Batson v. South Louisiana Medical Center, 99-0232 (La. 11/19/99), 750
So. 2d 949, 959 (Lemmon, J., concurring).
140. 04-0451 (La. 12/01/04), 888 So. 2d 782.
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the ambit of the MMA, the court stated, "[The] coverage of the
MMA should be strictly construed because the limitations of the
MMA on the liability of qualified health care providers is special
legislation in derogation of the rights of tort victims.
, 141
The bystander claim should not be easily inserted within the
ambit of the MMA based on this rule of strict construction. The
bystander's situation is more analogous to a third person who is
injured as a result of a psychiatrist's failure to warn that the
psychiatrist's patient intended to harm the third person: The third
person's claim against the psychiatrist is not covered by the MMA
because the third person is not a patient, thus, there is no treatment
and no malpractice. 14 2 In addition, as a blood donor is not a
"patient" of a blood bank within the meaning of the MMA because
"he did not receive any health care or medical treatment
whatsoever,"' 143 for the same reason a bystander should not be
considered a "patient."
However, freeing the bystander from the provisions of the
MMA has negative repercussions. One drawback of allowing the
bystander to sue the health care provider in tort is that it subjects
the physician to an unlimited amount of personal liability. This is
not a beneficial solution from a societal standpoint as it will result
in increased health care costs and other unattractive consequences,
hindering the purpose of the cap in the MMA to ensure the
availability and affordability of medical care. 1
44
Allowing the bystander claimant to tap into a separate statutory
cap promotes the tort goals of compensating true injury.
Unfortunately, this does not comport with the statutory language of
the MMA. A possible solution to this conflict is to rank the tort
recovery theories subject to the $500,000 limit. This provides
greater sureness that the bystander will receive some form of
recovery. First and foremost, the patient is entitled to recover.
The bystander should then be allowed to recover since a bystander
claim is based on a completely separate injury. Since loss of
141. Id. at 787-88.
142. Maraist & Galligan, supra note 2, § 21-3(e), at 468.
143. Delcambre v. Blood Systems, Inc., 03-1130 (La. App. 3d Cir. 02/04/04),
866 So. 2d 352, 355.
144. See LaMark v. NME Hospitals, Inc., 542 So. 2d 753, 755-56 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1989); Turner v. Southwest Louisiana Hospital Assoc., 03-0237 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 10/01/03), 856 So. 2d 1237.
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consortium and wrongful death claims are derivative, their priority
for recovery should be last.'
45
The legislature could also solve this problem and at the same
time make the solution more equitable by amending the MMA to
either allow bystander claimants to tap into their own statutory cap
or to overrule the decision in Trahan by excluding bystander
claims from the governance of the MMA. In order to ensure the
availability and affordability of medical care, the best solution is
not only to uphold the decision of Trahan, but also to amend the
statute to allow bystanders their own statutory cap. This strikes a
suitable balance between ensuring an injured victim recovery and,
at the same time, allowing the qualified health care provider to
reap the benefits of limited liability.
C. The Bystander's Exclusion from Workers' Compensation
Exclusivity
Suppose that one day, Rose decides to meet her husband,
Pascal, for lunch. When she arrives at his place of employment,
she proceeds to look for him. As she walks into a room, she sees
an enormous barrel of caustic chemicals spill on Pascal. He is
severely burned as a result of the incident. She experiences severe
mental anguish and emotional distress from witnessing the
accident. Pascal's claim is governed by the WCA. However,
Rose's tort suit should not be precluded by the exclusivity
provisions of the WCA.
If an employee suffers a personal injury from an accident
arising out of and in the course of employment, the employer shall
pay compensation under the WCA.1 The rights and remedies
under the WCA are exclusive as against the employer, except for
intentional acts. 147  Unless the bystander is an employee, the
bystander damage claim does not arise out of the employer-
employee relationship. This is a prerequisite to the application of
145. Courts have not hesitated to limit recovery based on the derivative
nature of a claim in other contexts, therefore, placing the claims lower on the
totem pole of recovery should not be questionable.
146. La. R.S. 23:1031 (1998).
147. La. R.S. 23:1032 (A)(1)(a) (2001). "Except for intentional acts.., the
rights and remedies herein granted to an employee or his dependent on account
of an injury, or compensable sickness or disease for which he is entitled to
compensation under this Chapter, shall be exclusive of all other rights, remedies,
and claims for damages . . . as against his employer . . . for said injury, or
compensable sickness or disease."
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the WCA. 148 Since this prerequisite is lacking in the context of a
bystander claim, any discussion of the WCA is misplaced.
The legislative intent of the workers' compensation system is
complete tort immunity for the employer in exchange for assumed
liability for all work-related injuries. This guarantees economic
stability to the employee and his dependants. 149 Consequently,
courts consistently sustain exceptions of no right and no cause of
action because of this exclusive remedy provision in the workers'
compensation law. 150  The WCA is "focused on injuries to
employees, and resultant losses by them and certain o/their family
members" based on the injuries to the employees.' 1 Thus, the
employer's immunity from tort liability applies to loss of
consortium and wrongful death claims. 152 These claims of family
members are derivative of the employee's injuries and therefore,
within the reach of workers' compensation exclusivity.
As exemplified in Part III, the bystander damage claim is
distinguishable from derivative claims such as loss of consortium.
The analysis employed by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Raney
v. Walter 0. Moss Regional Hospital,154 in distinguishing a claim
involving fear of future illness from loss of consortium and other
derivative claims, serves as an excellent precedent because, like a
bystander claim, the case involved the application of the
exclusivity provision to non-emlloyees seeking recovery for the
breach of an independent duty. 55 In the bystander claim, the
individual is seeking compensation for mental pain and anguish
based not only on a separate, distinct, and independent injury, but
the breach of a separate, distinct, and independent duty.56 The
claim is for the emotional distress and mental anguish that the
148. See Mundy v. Kulkoni, Inc., 503 So. 2d 66, 68 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1987)
(stating that "[a]ny injury suffered by Mr. Mundy with regard to National
Marine arises out of the employer-employee relationship. Therefore, any
remedy or recovery to him or his wife is exclusively governed by the
compensation laws.").
149. Flynn v. Devore, 373 So. 2d 580, 586 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
150. Raney v. Walter 0. Moss Regional Hospital, 93-145 (La. App. 3d Cir.
01/05/94), 629 So. 2d 485, 488.
151. Id. (emphasis added).
152. E.g., Flynn, 373 So. 2d at 583.
153. See id. at 489.
154. 629 So. 2d 485.
155. Id. at 489. In upholding a worker's family members' suit in tort against
the employer for fear of future illness, the court emphasized that the "[p]laintiffs
are not claiming.., loss of consortium."
156. Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hospital, 556 So. 2d 559, 569 (La. 1990).
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bystander experiences and will continue to experience as a result of
witnessing the traumatic event. The bystander is not claiming
"injury" as the term is used in the WCA, as the injury for which
the bystander is seeking recompense is not based on "violence to
the physical structure" of the employee.' 
57
Not only are claims such as loss of consortium, wrongful death,
and survival actions hinged upon the injury to the injured
employee, but, more importantly, the claims are "directly
intertwined with the employee's injury."'' 58 A claimant bringing an
action for loss of consortium experiences a loss because the
employee injured on the job is suffering.' 59 On the other hand, a
bystander does not experience the mental anguish and emotional
distress simply because the injured employee is suffering. If that
was the case, then the claim would be superfluous when
considered in light of an action for loss of consortium. The
suffering of the injured employee is only one factor in addressing
the reasonableness of the bystander claim. 160  The focus of the
claim is on the severity of the traumatic event and the suffering of
the bystander; the suffering of the injured employee is not
dispositive.
When a suit in tort is barred upon the determination that the
claim falls within the provisions of the WCA, the claimant,
whether an employee or a relation of the employee, is limited to
recovery of those benefits specifically recognized under the
WCA. 1  Therefore, if the bystander claim is in the ambit of
workers' compensation exclusivity, then bystander damages would
not be compensable, as those damages are not specifically
recognized under the WCA. This is an unacceptable result and
incompatible with the rule of strict construction applicable to
statutes in derogation of an individual's rights. 162 Since workers'
157. See La. R.S. 23:1021(8) (1991 & Supp. 2004) (emphasis added).
158. Raney, 629 So. 2d at 489.
159. Id.
160. See La. Civ. Code art. 2315.6 (requiring, among other things, that the
injured person "suffer such harm that one can reasonably expect a person in the
claimant's position to suffer serious mental anguish or emotional distress from
the experience.").
161. Whiddon v. Livingston Parish Council, 00-1349 (La. App. 1st Cir.
09/28/01), 809 So. 2d 421, 430.
162. See Sparks v. Tulane Med. Ctr. Hosp. & Clinic, 546 So. 2d 138, 146
(La. 1989). The court stated that the terms of the Workers' Compensation Act
are accorded a "liberal construction in order to effectuate its beneficent purpose
of relieving workmen of the economic burden of work-connected injuries by
diffusing the costs in channels of commerce." The negative inference can be
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compensation exclusivity is in derogation of general tort rights, in
the absence of explicit statutory language limiting or excluding
such rights of the bystander, a bystander suit should not be barred.
The legislature uses broad and clear language in their drafting
of the exclusivity provision in the WCA. 163 This broad and clear
language has facilitated the ease within which claims such as loss
of consortium have been engulfed within the ever-expanding reach
of workers' compensation exclusivity. 164 This sweeping language
makes it all too easy for individuals to assert that if the legislature
had meant to exclude a bystander claim from the exclusivity
provision, they would have simply done so explicitly. The flip-
side of this allegation is the possibility that the legislature did not
feel the need to waste their breath excluding a claim, which so
apparently does not fall within the reach of workers' compensation
exclusivity.
If the wife in the hypothetical had instead been splashed by the
chemicals, no one would question her ability and right to sue her
husband's employer in tort for her injuries. There is no
justification to draw an arbitrary line between this right to sue and
the wife's right to sue for bystander mental anguish damages. In
the supreme court case of Sparks v. Tulane Medical Center
Hospital and Clinic,'65 the court stated that "when an employee
suffers from a mental disability which is serious enough to render
that employee unable to work, then the injury has done violence to
the physical structure of the body."' 66  There is no distinction
between emotional distress and physical injury with respect to the
right of recovery.' 67 There is no reason to make a distinction in
this context.
drawn, i.e., the application of strict construction when the claim involves a
bystander in which the statute is not concerned of relieving the economic burden
of work-connected injuries.
163. Adams v. J. E. Merit Construction, Inc., 97-2005 (La. 05/19/98), 712
So. 2d 88, 92.
164. See, e.g., Whiddon, 809 So. 2d at 430 (the loss of enjoyment of life, loss
of earning capacity, and mental anguish claims of the worker's children and
spouse fell within workers' compensation exclusivity).
165. 546 So. 2d 138.
166. Id. at 145.
167. See Guillory v. Arceneaux, 580 So. 2d 990, 996 (La. App. 3d Cir.
05/22/91), writ denied, 587 So. 2d 694. See also Sparks, 546 So. 2d at 146
(stating that "there is no bright-line distinction between 'physical' and 'mental'
injuries, either in medicine or in law, which provides a reliable basis for
awarding or denying workmen's compensation benefits.").
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V. COMPLETING THE PUZZLE: THE BYSTANDER'S PLACE
ESTABLISHED
The role of article 2315.6 within the current framework of the
tort system and broader legislative scheme is now clarified. The
initial concern involved the dispute regarding the nature of the
bystander claim. Since many answers are arrived at on the basis of
the derivative nature of a claim, resolving this issue was a
prerequisite if any further discussions were to have any value. A
bystander claim is not derivative of the trauma victim's injury. An
independent duty is owed to an aggrieved, non-traumatically
injured plaintiff based on an individual's interest in freedom from
mental disturbance. As a result, the bystander has a right to seek
compensation for this mental anguish and emotional distress.
Since the bystander claim is not derivative in nature, when the
underlying accident involves an automobile, the claimant is not
constrained to the per person limits of the automobile liability
insurance policy when that limit is based on the derivative nature
of the claim. The bystander is also not constrained by the per
person limits of the policy when the limit is based on the
application of the term "bodily injury," as a bystander's mental
anguish is "bodily injury."
The bystander is claiming a separate and independent injury
from the injury to the patient in the context of a medical
malpractice suit. Although the bystander claim is independent and
not derivative of the injury to the patient, the bystander is still
subject to the same statutory cap as the patient due to the statutory
language of the MMA. The Louisiana Legislature is invited to
remedy this defect by excluding the claim from the governance of
the MMA or allowing the bystander a separate cap of liability.
Lastly, when the bystander is not an employee, the workers'
compensation exclusivity provision is not applicable to the
bystander claim. The bystander should be free to seek
compensation for his mental pain and anguish through a suit in
tort. t68
Jessica Coco*
168. This comment is not intended to condone the limitations of liability
based merely on the derivative nature of a claim. It is simply a recognition of a
current pattern in this state and the need to fit bystander damage claims within
the pattern.
* The author would like to thank Professor Frank L. Maraist, Nolan J.
Edwards Professor and Holt B. Harrison Professor, Professor at the Paul M.
Hebert Law Center, for his guidance in developing this topic.
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